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Abstract. Public policy making has direct and indirect impacts on social 
behaviors. However, using system dynamics model alone to assess these 
impacts fails to consider the interactions among social elements, thus may 
produce doubtful conclusions.  In this study, we examine the political science 
theory of greed and grievance in modeling civil conflicts. An agent-based 
model is built based on an existing rebellion model in Netlogo. The 
modifications and improvements in our model are elaborated. Several case 
studies are used to demonstrate the use of our model for investigating emergent 
phenomena and implications of governmental policies.  
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1   Introduction 
In this research we are interested in modeling civil conflicts using the agent-based 
computational approach, so as to study the behavior of the populace in a specific 
national environment and to investigate the impact of governmental policies. Based 
on the greed and grievance theory, a person rebels because 1) he has enormous 
grievance towards the central government and 2) he sees the opportunities (e.g., 
economical benefits, political advantages, etc.) of becoming a rebel. Therefore, we 
may say that the occurrence of civil conflict is the result of the interaction of populace 
within its environment, including the reactions of individuals to their life conditions 
and their interactions with neighbors, with the general national status (weak or strong 
state) and the authoritarian power of government, etc. Agent-based models (ABMs) 
are the natural choice of modeling such complex systems.  
The NOEM model, developed by the Air Force Rome Laboratory, is a large-scale 
computer simulation model built on system dynamics principles for simulating 
nation-state operational environment. Through it we may study the causal relationship 
between exogenous factors and nation-state’s social and economical status, as well as 
the impact of various policy options. We postulate that the NOEM will provide a 
valid nation-state environment for ABM simulation. For example, the indicators for 
the economic conditions of a nation, such as GDP, GINI, can be imported from the 
NOEM and they are used in ABMs to create a nation’s economy map. The agents in 
ABMs will possess certain properties that link them to their living environment. They 
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also follow certain behavior rules and interact with the environment. The NOEM is a 
system dynamics (SD) model, where macroscopic difference equations are used to 
calculate the change of nation-state variables.  The ABM technique takes a different 
approach. It models at the microscopic level, modeling individual agent’s (it can be a 
person) behavior, and how it interacts with its neighbors and its environment.   
2 Theory of greed and grievance in civil conflicts 
In the seminal paper by Collier and Hoeffler (2002), the outbreak of civil war was 
explained from two possible views: severe grievance and atypical opportunity (greed) 
for building a rebel organization. The grievance model is in line with the motivation 
cause of conflict explained in the political science literature. Grievance is fueled by 
the polarization of a society, which is caused by poor governance. The opportunity 
model explains the outbreak of civil war from an economic feasibility point of view. 
An interesting hypothesis proposed in Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2008) states that 
where civil war is feasible it will occur without reference to motivation. This 
“feasibility hypothesis” is substantiated by analyzing past civil war data and finding 
that the variables, which are close proxies for feasibility, have powerful consequences 
to the risk of a civil war.  
Collier and Hoeffler’s theory has stirred a heated debate on the true causes of 
conflicts among political scientists, sociologists and economists. Although most 
empirical studies conducted at the World Bank support the greed model (see, Ganesan 
and Vines, 2004, Bodea and Elbadawi, 2007), many researchers rebutted the notion 
that the onset of conflict is purely determined by economic reasons or the motivation 
of rebellion is driven by seeking financial opportunity only. Some argued that the 
reductionist categories of greed and grievance not only obfuscate other social, ethnic 
and religious factors, but also mislead the intervention policy of international 
community (Kuran, 1989, Gurr and Moore, 1997, Gurr, 2000, Ballentine and 
Nitzschke, 2003, Regan and Norton, 2003). This is specifically demonstrated by 
studying conflicts in some African countries (Agbonifo, 2004, and Abdullah, 2006). It 
seems that this debate will continue. In our study, we do not intend to validate this 
theory, but simply apply it on an artificial society and to observe the interactions of 
greed and grievance factors and the social consequence of governmental policy.  
3 Agent-based models 
An agent-based model (ABM) is a simulation environment where agents (e.g., 
simulated people) are defined to possess certain properties and behaviors, and they 
can interact with each other and with their surrounding environment. This type of 
model is different from other mathematical models, such as system dynamics, in 
several ways. First, the ABM is built in a bottom-up fashion. It defines the 
microscopic details of basic elements in a society and lets the society grow (or 
evolve) through agent-to-agent and agent-to-environment interactions. Second, the 
use of ABMs is typically to provide the macroscopic picture of how a society grows 
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and look for emergent phenomena. This is achieved by examining the statistics of 
collections of agents over the simulation time. The connections between micro-level 
details and macro-level phenomena can be used to explain cause-and-effects for the 
artificial society under study.  
Naturally, ABMs have been applied in many social science studies. See Epstein 
(1990) for supporting arguments of this computational approach to social science. 
Epstein and Axtell (1996) gave a full-fledged description of how to build an artificial 
society and examine its emergent phenomena on a sugarscape (an imagined land 
which provides sugars for the agents living on it).  For the civil conflict study, the 
most famous model is the rebellion model, which implements the greed and grievance 
theory on modeling agent’s behavior. It has been used to demonstrate certain conflict 
phenomena found in the real world and the effects of changing governmental policy 
(Epstein et al., 2001, Epstein, 2002, and Cederman and Girardin, 2007). More 
recently, a group in Netherlands used ABMs to simulate the war game scenario of 
foreign-force evasion on an island undergoing a civil war (van Lieburg et al. 2009, 
Borgers et al. 2009).  
In our study, we built an artificial land based on the sugarscape model and let 
rebels grow on this land and interact with the environment; thus, we call it “rebellion 
on sugarscape”. The sugarscape can be viewed as a resource map which is 
geospatially bounded. The behavior of an agent depends on the agent’s living 
environment (whether there are enough resources to support its living and whether 
there are rebels/cops in its neighborhood) and the policy set imposed on this artificial 
land. Our intention is to use this example to demonstrate the feasibility of the 
marriage of civil conflict theory and a resource map, which has not been done in the 
original rebellion model. In addition, we studied the behavior of rebellion and the 
consequences of policy setting when the resource is pre-defined. 
3.1 Rebellion on sugarscape model 
Although the rebellion model has been successfully used to explain some 
phenomena of civil conflicts, it lacks several aspects that we are interested in. First, 
the grievance level of each person is randomly given. In modeling a nation, we would 
like to link the grievance level to the person’s economic, social, and political status, or 
in other words, its quality of life.  Second, the number of cops is fixed. In reality, a 
government needs to spend enormous wealth on maintaining its military, police and 
other civil governing means. Third, in the current model, all agents can freely, 
randomly move. In reality, there may be many restrictions on a person’s movement 
for economic and political reasons.  
To address these problems, we created a refined model, called “rebellion on 
sugarscape”. The sugarscape is a layer of resource overlaid on the artificial land. 
Sugars (or resources) constantly grow on this land and can be collected by each agent, 
and by the government through taxation, to become personal wealth or the 
government’s wealth. However, the distributions of sugars are uneven. There are 
areas the sugar level is highest (4) and areas there is no sugar (0). We may interpret 
the sugar-rich region as the resource-rich city area and the sugar-poor region as the 
resource-depleted rural area, or the sugar-rich region as the region with oil fields and 
4 R. Pan 
 
the sugar-poor region as the region without oil. Initially, agents are randomly 
scattered on the land. An agent’s grievance will be linked to the location it resides. If 
it is in a sugar-rich region, its perceived hardship will be low, and vice versa. The 
general population can be defined either mobile or non-mobile. If it is mobile, a 
person will move to a place having at least a sugar level of 1 within its vision. This is 
based on the assumption that people want to seek a better life for themselves. Every 
person will collect wealth from the place it resides. The wealth it can collect is the 
same as the sugar level at its location. Part of the wealth will be taxed, and the 
government will use the tax revenue to either maintain the existing cops, or to create 
new cops, or to assist the people who are in poverty. In our model, a cop needs at least 
a value of 5-sugar level to survive. To create a new cop, the government needs to 
spend 10 sugars. The poverty line is set at 1-sugar level. If a person has less than 1 
sugar, it may be assisted by the government. The assisted amount is the total sugar 
that the government allocated to the assistance divided by the total number of people 
in poverty. Our model is depicted in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The rebellion on sugarscape model 
4 Case studies 
In this section, we present several case studies of the rebellion on sugarscape 
model. Our purposes are two-folded: 1) to validate the model against basic, intuitive 
scenarios; 2) to look for “surprises” that will lead to a better understanding of the 
model and of the consequences of policy setting.  
4.1 Case study #1: A baseline case 
First we test a baseline case, where the number of agents (general population) is 
1750 and the initial number of cops is 100. We prohibit the movement of agents 
(presenting a non-mobile society), and set both the wealth distributed to the poor and 
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the wealth for creating new cops to be 0. Therefore, the government will use its 
wealth to maintain the initial cop size throughout the simulation. The tax rate is set at 
30%.  
This baseline case is a simple recast of the rebellion model using a layer that 
defines the resources and links the people’s grievance to their wealth. Therefore, we 
should expect a similar behavior of rebels as in the previous rebellion simulation, 
except that the rebels will be most likely be in poor regions. We ran the simulation 
over 200 cycles. We observed that rebellions always happen in the places with less 
resource and the outburst of mass rebellion happens from time to time, and then it is 
countered by the cops. These periodic rebellion outbursts are similar to what has been 
described in the original rebellion model.  
4.2 Case study #2: Building cops vs. assisting the poor 
To suppress rebels, there are two basic strategies that the government can use – 
increasing the number of cops and providing financial assistance to the poor. In the 
following simulations, we tried both strategies and their combinations.  
First, we set the Wealth distribution=0 and Wealth to create cops=0.5. This implies 
that the government will send half of its wealth to maintain the existing cop force and 
half of it to increase cops, and no assistance to the poor. As some cops will die due to 
lack of sugars, the number of cops will eventually be stabilized at 158. There are 
occasionally one or two rebels, but they will be quickly detained by the cops 
surrounding them. Over time, the number of jailed individuals varies around 18 to 20. 
Next, we set Wealth to create cops=1.0, so all of the wealth the government 
collects will be spent on building new cops. Surprisingly, in the simulation, the cop 
size drops to 90 and a constant mass of rebels is created in the poor regions. We 
observe that a poor person is likely to choose cycling actions of being dormant, then 
actively rebel, and then be jailed. It is because they receive no help from the 
government and they cannot improve their lives by moving to rich regions, and in 
addition, there are not enough cops to suppress rebellions. The drop of cop force is 
surprising, given that the government wants to create more cops. But, in fact, most of 
the existing cops will die due to lack of sugar supply from the government, the new 
cops built by the government cannot keep up the pace of the dying cops. Increasing 
the number of new cops is more expensive, and the new cops are located randomly 
(less experience), less effective countering the rebels in the poor regions. Also, with 
more people put into jail, less tax revenue will be collected by the government, thus 
less funds for the cops. Moreover, from this simulation we observe that the periodic 
rebellion outbursts have been replaced by constant rebellions, which indicates the 
overall lack of a policing force.  
However, when we set Wealth distribution=0.5 (half of the wealth will be 
redistributed to the people under the poverty line) and Wealth to create cops=0, we 
observe that there is still enough wealth to support 100 cops. In fact, there are very 
few incidences of rebellion, and even if there is an active rebel, these will be quickly 
detained by the cops. Over the course of the simulation, the number of jailed 
individuals varies from 0 to 5. This is a peaceful society. The poor will be assisted by 
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the government, so their grievance levels cannot be too high. Also, the government 
will maintain a sizable force of cops.  
4.3 Other cases  
Table 1.  Summary of the cases being studied and their emerging phenomena 
   
Case Parameter Emerging phenomenon  
   
Baseline case  As in Section 4.1 Periodic outburst of rebellion as in the 
rebellion model 
Increasing the 
number of cops 
wealth-distribution=0, wealth-
to-create-cop=0.5 
Number of cops increases, but still 
have rebels from time to time 
wealth-distribution=0, wealth-
to-create-cop=1 
Number of cops decreases, have a large 
number of rebels 
Assisting the poor wealth-distribution=0.5, 
wealth-to-create-cop=0 
Very few rebels, the number of cops is 
maintained at the initial level 
Freedom to move movement?=on, wealth-
distribution=0, wealth-to-
create-cop=0 
People move to rich regions, cops 
move to poor regions, rebellion 
happens at the boundaries of rich and 
poor regions 
movement?=on, wealth-
distribution=0.5, wealth-to-
create-cop=0.2 
No rebel 
Less population number of agents=250, initial 
number of cops=15, 
movement?=on, wealth-
distribution=0 
The percentage of population who 
rebels increases, the frequency of 
rebellion increases 
number of agents=250, initial 
number of cops=15, 
movement?=on, wealth-
distribution=0.5 
No rebel 
number of agents=250, initial 
number of cops=15, 
movement?=on, wealth-
distribution=0, wealth-to-
create-cop=0.5 
The cop number increases to 22, but 
still have rebels in less wealthy regions 
High tax tax=0.5 Massive rebels in less wealthy regions 
even when the government 
redistributes some of its wealth to the 
poor 
Less education vision=3 patches Some people will be isolated in poor 
regions, rebels happen at these poor 
regions, government assistance will 
help reduce rebels 
Less government 
legitimacy 
government-legitimacy=0.35 More rebels than quiet population, cop 
number is reduced, the government 
collapses. The legitimacy level of 0.75 
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is the boundary value for maintaining 
an effective government. 
5. Some issues for future research 
In this simple artificial society we simulated, an agent’s grievance is determined by 
its perceived hardship and its perceived government legitimacy only. Although we are 
able to link the agent’s perceived hardship to its wealth (sugar level), the model is far 
away from a real world where people have various motivations for becoming rebels. 
Regarding to the motivations of violent non-state actors (VNSA), Bartolomei et al. 
(2004) postulated a framework of summarizing grievance from the perspective of 
human needs.  On the national level, we may identify a group of variables that are 
important to the health of the nation, but to use ABMs we have to associate these 
macroscopic measurements with microscopic perceptions of individual agents. Little 
research has been done on this front so far, but this is a critical link between SD 
model and ABM.  
Finally the details of how to utilize the NOEM as a nation-state environment for 
ABMs still need to be researched. The overall architecture that we envisioned is that 
from the NOEM we can create multiple layers of maps, corresponding to the nationals 
economic, social and political variables, and use them to define the properties and 
behavior rules of agents living on the artificial land. However, to materialize this 
concept, in-depth investigations of the NOEM’s capabilities and its potential use for 
ABMs are required.  
Acknowledgement: 
The author thanks the AFRL Summer Faculty Fellowship Program for its support 
of this research, and thanks Dr. John Salerno for his advising during the author’s stay 
at the Air Force Rome Laboratory in the summers of 2009 and 2010. 
References: 
I. Abdullah (2006). Africans do not live by bread alone: against greed, not 
grievance. Africa Review of Books, March 2006, page 12-13. 
J. Agbonifo (2004). Beyond greed and grievance: negotiating political settlement 
and peace in africa. Peace, Conflict and Development, issue 4, ISSN: 1742-0601. 
J. Bartolomei, W. Casebeer, T. Thomas (2004). Modeling violent non-state actors: 
a summary of concepts and methods. Institute for Information Technology 
Applications (IITA) Research Publication 4, Information Series, United State Air 
Force Academy, Colorado.  
K. Ballentine and H. Nitzschke (2003). Beyond greed and grievance: policy 
lessons from studies in the political economy of armed conflict. IPA Policy Report. 
8 R. Pan 
 
Program on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (EACW), International Peace 
Academy. 
C. Bodea and I. A. Elbadawi (2007). Riots, coups and civil war: revisiting the 
greed and grievance debate. Policy Research Working Paper, 4397. The World Bank, 
Development Research Group, Macroeconomics and Growth Team. 
E. Borgers, M. Kwint, P. Petiet, M. Spaans (2009). Training effect based 
reasoning; developing a next generation of training simulators. Interservice/Industry 
Training, Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC). 
L.-E. Cederman and L. Girardin (2007). A roadmap to realistic computational 
models of civil wars. Advancing Social Simulation: The First World Congress. S. 
Takahashi, D. Sallach and J. Rouchier, Springer Japan. 
P. Collier and A. Hoeffler (2000). Greed and grievance in civil war. World Bank. 
P. Collier, A. Hoeffler and D. Rohner (2008). Beyond greed and grievance: 
feasibility and civil war. Technical Report, the World Bank.  
J. M. Epstein (1999). Agent-based computational models and generative social 
science. Complexity, vol. 4, no. 5, pp. 41-60. 
J. M. Epstein (2002). Modeling civil violence: An agent-based computational 
approach. Proceedings of National Academy of Science, vol. 99, suppl. 3, pp. 7243-
7250. 
J. M. Epstein and R. L. Axtell (1996). Growing Artificial Societies. The MIT Press. 
T. Kuran (1989). Sparks and prairie fires: a theory of unanticipated political 
revolution. Public Choice, vol. 61, pp. 41-74. 
A. Ganesan and A. Vines (2004). Engine of war: resources, greed, and the 
predatory State. Technical Report, the World Bank. 
T. R. Gurr and W. H. Moore (1997). Ethnopolitical rebellion: a cross-sectional 
analysis of the 1980s with risk assessments for the 1990s. American Journal of 
Political Science, vol. 41, no. 4, pp. 1079-1103. 
T. R. Gurr (2000). People Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century. 
Washington, DC: Unitied States Institute of Peace Press. 
A. van Lieburg, P. J. Petiet and N. P. Le Grand (2007). Improving wargames using 
complex system practices.  Technical Paper. TNO Defense and Security, The Hague, 
Netherlands. 
J. von Neumann (1966). Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata. Edited by A. W. 
Burks. University of Illinois Press. 
P. M. Regan and D. A. Norton (2003). Greed, grievance, and mobilization: the 
onset of protest, rebellion, and civil war. Technical Paper. Department of Political 
Science, Binghamton University. 
U. Wilensky (2004). Netlogo rebellion model. Center for Connected Learning and 
Computer-Based Modelling, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL. 
 
